






ics among professional economists. On one side
of the discussion were Milton Friedman and
economists of “Chicago School” persuasion who
argued that trend inflation was always and every-
where a monetary phenomenon. An alternative
perspective was the “Phillips curve” view that
the level of the unemployment rate was the prin-
cipal determinant of the rate of inflation. From
that perspective, policy actions reducing the
unemployment rate were seen to provoke a per-
manent increase in the rate of inflation. A third
view at the time, frequently incorporated into
the Phillips curve perspective, was that institu-
tional structures such as the market power of
concentrated firms over prices or of labor unions
over wages also contributed to upward trends in
the general level of prices.
In the late 1960s, Milton Friedman and
Edmond Phelps introduced the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve and the concept of the
natural rate of unemployment. Under this hypoth-
esis, there is no permanent trade-off between
unemployment and inflation. Any trade-off is at
best transitory, and reductions in unemployment
gained through increased inflation disappear as
private agents adjust their expectations about
future inflation to the new inflation environment.
Once this adjustment of expectations has occurred,
all that is left would be the new higher inflation-
ary environment. In the early 1970s, this theory
gained wide acceptance among academic econo-
mists, though its acceptance by policymakers
was slower.
As this discussion on inflation processes
was evolving, the oil price shocks of 1973-74
and 1979 occurred. Initially these shocks were
T
he U.S. economy today is limping
along. Some believe recession is at
hand; others, and I include myself in
this group, believe the economy will
skirt recession. The difference in view may not
be very large, as an economy growing at a barely
positive rate will look and feel about the same
as one with output falling slightly.
In recent speeches I have discussed a number
of issues relating to the economic outlook, includ-
ing especially problems in the mortgage market
and the process by which the economy will in
time restore greater stability to financial markets.
Today I will discuss inflation. Federal Reserve
policy is always and unavoidably a balancing act
between unemployment concerns and inflation
concerns. There is no question that in popular
debates today the risk of higher unemployment
is the No. 1 concern, but my reading of economic
history is that we generally live to regret a mone-
tary policy focused exclusively on the No. 1 eco-
nomic concern of the day.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Robert H. Rasche, senior vice president
and director of research, provided special assis-
tance. However, I retain full responsibility for
errors.
TRENDS IN INFLATION
Forty to 50 years ago, the sources and dynam-
ics of trends in inflation were hotly debated top-viewed as contributing to inflation trends. Over
time, though, economists came to believe that
supply shocks that caused large changes in rela-
tive prices—even very persistent or permanent
changes in relative prices—could have only tran-
sitory effects on the inflation rate unless accom-
modated by monetary policy.
As late as 1979, former Federal Reserve
Chairman Arthur Burns attributed the ongoing
rise of inflation to fundamental changes in social
institutions and values. Burns argued that these
changes produced
…a persistent inflationary bias that has
emerged from the philosophic and political cur-
rents that have been transforming economic
life in the United States and elsewhere since
the 1930s. The essence of the unique inflation
of our times and the reason central bankers
have been ineffective in dealing with it can
be understood only in terms of those currents
of thought and the political environment they
have created.1
By the 1980s, the hypothesis that trend infla-
tion was a monetary phenomenon had gained
almost universal acceptance among economists
and policymakers. Fed Chairman Paul Volcker
applied monetary medicine to tame the inflation
of the 1970s and by 1984 achieved a roughly sta-
ble rate of inflation in the neighborhood of 4 per-
cent per year. The experience and pain of the
Volcker disinflation plus the emerging theoretical
consensus among economists led central bankers
throughout the world to conclude that the primary
responsibility of monetary policy is to maintain
price stability. Even in the United States where
legislation explicitly defines a “dual mandate”
for the Federal Reserve System, the primacy of
the price stability goal is acknowledged. For
example, in his first speech after his swearing-in,
Chairman Bernanke stated:
Although price stability is an end of monetary
policy, it is also a means by which policy can
achieve its other objectives. In the jargon, price
stability is both a goal and an intermediate
target of policy. As I will discuss, when prices
are stable, both economic growth and stability
are likely to be enhanced, and long-term inter-
est rates are likely to be moderate. Thus, even
a policymaker who places relatively less weight
on price stability as a goal in its own right
should be careful to maintain price stability as
a means of advancing other critical objectives.2
The mechanisms through which central
banks pursue an inflation objective are varied. In
the 1970s and 1980s, the monetarist perspective,
following Milton Friedman, was that central
banks must target low and stable monetary growth.
If the central bank established such a policy
regime, a low and stable trend rate of inflation
was expected to follow. The controlled growth
rate of the money stock would provide the nomi-
nal anchor for the economy.
In the latter part of the 19th century, most
Western central banks subscribed to the gold
standard. In this environment, prices tended to
fluctuate around a constant level. Certainly there
were changes in the price level from year to year,
sometimes quite substantial, but such changes
tended to be reversed. The average trend in infla-
tion was close to zero. The gold standard pro-
vided a nominal anchor for these economies. If
central banks adhered to the rules of the gold
standard, gold flowed out of a country when its
price level rose and into a country when its price
level fell. When these gold flows were allowed
to feed through to the stock of money, as was
supposed to be the case under the gold standard,
changes in domestic prices were reversed over
time. Hence, the gold standard maintained price
stability through automatic adjustments of the
money stock. The money stock was not itself a
policy tool, but the policy rule in place—the gold
standard—generated the required adjustment of
the money stock to restore price stability.
In the late 1980s, after the Volcker disinflation
and in response to a widespread acceptance of
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1 A.F. Burns, “The Anguish of Central Banking,” Per Jacobsson Lecture, Belgrade Yugoslavia, September 30, 1979, p. 9.
2 “The Benefits of Price Stability,” February 24, 2006. <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060224a.htm>.the theory of the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve, central bankers acknowledged their
responsibility to provide a nominal anchor for
their economies. In the United States, Chairman
Volcker and, following him, Chairman Greenspan
defined price stability as an inflation rate suffi-
ciently low that businesses and households did
not take it into consideration in their day-to-day
economic decisions. In January 1988, the then
governor of the Bank of Canada, John Crow,
delivered a public lecture in which he stated
that “price stability was set out explicitly as the
Bank’s prime objective and, realistically, the only
thing that it could deliver with the tools at its
disposal.”3 In 1990, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand became the first official inflation-targeting
central bank when it negotiated an agreement
with the government that specified a numeric
inflation objective for monetary policy.
In the judgment of Governor Crow’s succes-
sor at the Bank of Canada, Governor Gordon
Thiesson, the statement of his predecessor was
inadequate as a policy objective because “price
stability, although often referred to, was not, how-
ever, clearly defined.”4 Subsequently, in February
1991, the Bank of Canada and the Canadian min-
ister of finance introduced explicit inflation
reduction targets in the New Zealand style. In
subsequent years, more and more central banks
adopted such numeric inflation targets, including
the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of England and
the European Central Bank. While the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)—the Federal
Reserve’s main monetary policymaking body—
has not adopted an explicit numeric inflation
target, many individual FOMC participants have
been quite forthright about their views on price
stability or “comfort zones” for inflation. I am on
record as favoring a target in terms of the personal
consumption price index of 1.5 percent annual
rate of increase plus or minus 0.5 percent.
CONTROLLING INFLATION
The issue today is less about the desirability
of controlling inflation, or about the appropriate
inflation target range, than about the specification
of a monetary policy to achieve the agreed objec-
tives of low inflation and a high level of employ-
ment. In 1993, Stanford economist John Taylor
proposed a simple equation as an approximate
description of the systematic policy of the
Greenspan Fed to that date. The FOMC, then
and now, conducts policy by setting a target for
the overnight federal funds rate, which is the
interest rate on one-day loans in the interbank
market. From his study of the FOMC’s actual
behavior, Taylor concluded that the committee
had adjusted its target for the federal funds rate
in response to three elements: 1) a target or desired
rate of inflation; 2) deviations of the actual infla-
tion rate from the target rate; and 3) deviations of
real output (GDP) from a measure of trend or
“potential” output. Taylor incorporated these
considerations in a specific equation, now widely
known as the “Taylor rule.” Subsequent analysis
showed that a central bank that followed such a
policy rule with a sufficiently aggressive response
to deviations of actual inflation from the target
level would provide a nominal anchor for the
economy.
A critically important part of Taylor’s analysis
was the distinction between the real and nominal
rate of interest. The nominal rate of interest is
observed directly in the market. At present, for
example, the FOMC’s target for the federal funds
rate is 3 percent and the actual rate in the market
is close to this target. The real rate of interest is
the nominal rate less the expected rate of inflation.
When the rate of inflation exceeds the nominal
rate of interest, a lender is actually subsidizing a
borrower because a loan is repaid—principal and
interest together—with dollars of lower purchas-
ing power than those originally lent.
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4 Ibid.Recall that the gold standard automatically
checked inflation because a country experiencing
inflation would lose gold, which would depress
the money stock and tend to return the price
level to its initial state. Under the Taylor rule, a
similar mechanism would be at work, provided
the coefficients in the equation defining the rule
were appropriate. For the policy rule to produce
the desired results, a central bank has to raise or
lower its nominal interest rate target enough so
that the real rate of interest rises or falls in
response to inflation above or below the inflation
target. For example, if the inflation rate were to
rise by one percentage point, the FOMC would
have to raise its target federal funds rate by one
percentage point just to keep the real rate of
interest unchanged. A typical Taylor rule speci-
fication would call for the FOMC to increase its
target fed funds rate by 1.5 percentage points to
ensure that the real rate of interest actually rises
when inflation rises.
If the money-demand function were stable, a
central bank that pursued such an interest rate
policy would find that the growth rate of the
money stock would fall when inflation rose above
target. Similarly, under the Taylor rule money
growth would tend to rise when inflation fell
below the target. If a central bank is successful in
maintaining a relatively low rate of inflation, the
resulting average growth in the money stock will
be relatively low and stable. Hence, a central bank
following an appropriately specified Taylor rule
with an invariant inflation target would induce
the pattern of money growth that the monetarists
argued was required for a nominal anchor in the
economy. The Taylor rule reconciles somewhat
different theoretical approaches of economists
who emphasize the money stock in their analy-
sis of monetary policy and those who emphasize
interest rates in their analysis.
I have been emphasizing the inflation part of
the Taylor rule, but it is important to put equal
emphasis on the real GDP part. Some specifica-
tions of the Taylor rule substitute the unemploy-
ment rate for real GDP, but for present purposes
the two are equivalent given that unemployment
and the deviation of real GDP from potential
GDP are closely related. The Taylor rule calls for
the central bank to reduce its interest rate target
when GDP drops below potential, and the larger
the gap between actual and potential GDP, the
larger is the reduction in the target interest rate.
There is a substantial literature examining
how to set the coefficients on the inflation and
real GDP terms in the Taylor equation to achieve
the best possible balance between the goals of
low inflation and high employment. Researchers
have also examined other issues, such as whether
a policy based on forecasts of inflation and real
GDP works better than one based on the most
recent actual readings of these variables. The
complexities are considerable, in part because
first releases of data are subject to revision and
forecasts are subject to substantial errors.
The FOMC's decisions are informed by the
Taylor rule and the extensive research behind it.
However, the committee does not follow the rule
precisely, as it can bring other considerations to
bear, such as knowledge of the state of the finan-
cial markets and a wide variety of other informa-
tion. A great deal is known about inflation
processes that cannot at this time be incorporated
in a Taylor-type equation in a precise way. A basic
understanding of inflation dynamics is important
to understanding FOMC policy. It is to this sub-




A convenient framework for organizing a
discussion of short-run inflation dynamics is the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve that I
mentioned previously. In a diagram with the rate
of inflation on the vertical axis and the rate of
unemployment on the horizontal axis, picture a
line drawn so that a higher rate of unemployment
is associated with a lower rate of inflation. This
line reflects a short-run situation. In this frame-
work, economists identify three sources of infla-
tion dynamics. First, there are permanent, or
semi-permanent, changes in the inflation rate
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consumers and firms about future actual rates of
inflation. In the textbook graph, a one-time change
in the expected rate of inflation is reflected in a
long-lasting shift up or down in the short-run
relation between the inflation rate and the unem-
ployment rate, or more generally the rate of uti-
lization of resources. The relevant variable is the
gap between the actual and natural rate of unem-
ployment, or between the level of GDP and poten-
tial GDP. Second, there are transitory changes in
the inflation rate that result from changes in the
rate of resource utilization in the economy. A
transitory change is represented by a movement
along a short-run Phillips curve. Third, there are
transitory changes in inflation as a result of tem-
porary shifts up or down in the short-run Phillips
curve because of “supply shocks” or more gener-
ally changes in relative prices. Typically, such
changes are identified as shocks to food or energy
prices, though they could result from changes in
many other relative prices. Examples would
include changes in nominal exchange rates that
alter prices of imported goods relative to domes-
tically produced goods or certain domestic tax
changes. Measures of “core inflation,” which I
will discuss in a few minutes, in principle are
designed to filter out very short-run movements
in inflation originating from some of these sources
in order to give better insight into fundamental
forces affecting the inflation rate.
The effects of supply shocks and resource
utilization weigh on the minds of policymakers
as witnessed by a comment in minutes of the
December 2007 FOMC meeting:
Participants thought that recent increases in
energy prices likely would boost headline
inflation temporarily, but with futures prices
pointing to a gradual decline in oil prices and
with pressures on resource utilization seen as
likely to ease a bit, most participants continued
to anticipate some moderation in core and
especially headline inflation over the next few
years.5 (Italics added)
Recent research at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis suggests that such movements along
a short-run Phillips curve or transitory shifts up
and down in that curve only account for a rela-
tively minor portion of the observed inflation in
the United States since the mid 1950s. The dom-
inant factor in U.S. inflation history over the past
50 years has been changes in inflation expecta-
tions, or semi-permanent shifts up and down in
the short-run Phillips curve. When it comes to
the forces behind U.S. inflation, expectations
trump the gap.6 While some observers might be
startled by this conclusion, reflection on the
broad outline of our economic history should
allay any apprehensions. In the 1960s and 1970s,
successive business cycle peaks had both higher
inflation and higher unemployment rates,
explained by increases in inflation expectations.
After the recession of 1990-91, both inflation and
unemployment trended down for the remainder
of the decade. In the textbook paradigm, such
patterns can only be produced by shifts in the
short-run Phillips curve generated by changes in
inflation expectations. Indeed, direct evidence
on inflation expectations suggests that expecta-
tions did trend gradually down over the 1990s.
The conclusion that expectations trump the
gap in generating inflation is extremely impor-
tant for monetary policy. It implies that low and
stable inflation will only be observed when the
private sector’s expectations of inflation are
solidly entrenched at a low level.
MEASURING INFLATION
EXPECTATIONS
If expectations about future inflation held by
households and firms are a critical determinant
of actual inflation, then how can policymakers
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6 J.M. Piger and R.H. Rasche, “Inflation: Do Expectations Trump the Gap?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper 2006-013B.monitor such expectations? In the past 20 years,
survey measures of expectations of inflation at
longer horizons have become available. The best
known of such measures is the survey of profes-
sional forecasters conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. This survey has
been conducted quarterly since the fourth quarter
of 1991 and focuses on expectations of 10-year
average CPI inflation. The respondent sample is
relatively small.7
A decade ago, the U.S. Treasury started issuing
bonds that are indexed to the CPI. Over time, new
issues of these securities became available on a
regular calendar and market liquidity improved.
It is now possible to observe the difference
between the yields on conventional nominal
Treasury bonds and indexed bonds of compara-
ble maturity. The yield difference typically is
referenced as “inflation compensation” since, in
addition to measuring expectations in financial
markets about future inflation, the rate spread
between conventional and indexed bonds
includes a premium to compensate for differences
in liquidity between the two types of bonds and
a premium to cover inflation risk.
As an aside, inflation compensation in the
bond market seems to me to be a more reliable
measure of inflation expectations than survey
information, because investors have put money
on their expectations and not just an answer on a
survey form. The disadvantage of the bond mar-
ket measure is that experience dates back only to
1997, when the U.S. Treasury first issued infla-
tion-indexed bonds.
Long-term inflation expectations, as meas-
ured by the survey data, trended steadily down
through the early 1990s and then stabilized.
They have differed little from 2.5 percent since
1998. Inflation compensation in the bond market
was less than 2 percent in early 2003 but then
rose and, since early 2004, has been around 2.5
percent. The survey- and market-based measures
are quite consistent.
From this evidence, we can conclude that
the current situation is one of substantial stabil-
ity of inflation expectations. This observation is
extremely important, because of the evidence that,
historically, changes in inflation expectations
have been by far the largest driver of changes in
the actual rate of inflation. Recent relatively
small increases in inflation are apparently due to
transitory factors and not to changes in inflation
expectations. Of course, the FOMC must continue
to pursue a monetary policy that is consistent
with well-anchored inflation expectations.
CORE VERSUS HEADLINE
INFLATION
I have emphasized the importance of distin-
guishing temporary from longer-lasting changes
in the rate of inflation. The concept of “core”
inflation is an effort to make the distinction more
precise.
The origins of core measures of inflation are
somewhat obscure. As early as 1957, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) published a special con-
sumer price index excluding food.8 Presumably,
the rationale for this price index was that, in the
short-run, food prices are highly volatile and are
affected by weather and agricultural production
conditions that are independent of the fundamen-
tal forces driving the overall rate of inflation. In
1973-74 the U.S. economy experienced an oil
price shock when OPEC imposed an embargo on
oil shipments to the United States. Beginning in
1977, the BLS started publishing a special CPI
price index excluding food and energy prices.9
Such indexes have become known as “core”
price indexes.
Do core measures of inflation give a better
measure of longer-run inflation trends? If the rel-
7 Recent surveys have about 50 respondents. At times in earlier years the sample was considerably smaller.
8 A special CPI price index for all items excluding food first appeared in the Monthly Labor Review of July 1957, Table D-3.
9 A special CPI price index for all items less food and energy first appeared in the April 1977 issue of the publication CPI Detailed Report.
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frequency transitory components, then these
measures likely provide useful insights. However,
these prices may not always display such char-
acteristics. Economists at the St. Louis Fed have
noted that, since 2003, inflation as measured by
the core personal consumption price index has
been consistently lower than inflation measured
by the headline, or total, personal consumption
price index.10
It does not seem likely that core measures of
inflation were intended to filter out the impact
of sustained trends in relative prices from the
measurement of overall inflation. Certainly the
relative prices of computers and consumer elec-
tronics have been falling for many years, even
without adjustments for quality changes. No one,
to my knowledge, has proposed removing the
prices of computers and consumer electronics to
measure core inflation. The economic forces at
work here are trends, not high-frequency transi-
tory fluctuations. Could it be that there are now
trends in place in the relative prices of food and
energy? I am not prepared to dismiss this possibil-
ity. Rapid economic development in China and
India has placed increased demand on the world
capacity to produce both food and energy and
therefore has surely contributed to the persistent
gap between core and headline inflation numbers
observed over the past five years. It is not unrea-
sonable to forecast that increased demand for food
and energy by emerging economies with large
populations will continue for a considerable
period. This possibility suggests the FOMC must
exercise caution lest monetary policy inadver-
tently accommodate an increased inflation trend
by focusing on the behavior of price indexes
excluding food and energy.
Although the danger is real, it is also true
that oil futures prices for contracts several years
ahead do not suggest continuing increases in oil
prices of the magnitude observed over the past
five years. That was also true five years ago—the
futures market turned out to be wrong. However,
my view is that policymakers should rely on the
judgment of the markets unless we have solid
evidence that the markets are wrong. My personal
experience is that, although the markets obviously
can be wrong, I have no confidence that my own




How much persistence will we observe in
departures from trend inflation? From my discus-
sion above, one critical element in the answer to
this question is how sensitive inflation expecta-
tions are to actual changes in inflation. Persistence
of inflation expectations is not independent of
market perceptions as to how the central bank is
pursuing its inflation objective. If actual inflation
deviates from expected inflation, and households
and firms believe that the central bank will
move aggressively to restore inflation to a well-
understood inflation target, then there will be
little reason for them to adjust their longer-run
inflation expectations. Markets will then help
the central bank to minimize the persistence of
the inflation fluctuations. If, however, households
and firms perceive that the central bank will not
move aggressively against an unwelcome change
in inflation, then they may adjust their longer-run
inflation expectations and, in doing so, amplify
and make more persistent the change in inflation.
The inflation-fighting credibility of the central
bank is a crucial factor, perhaps the most critical
factor, in short-run inflation dynamics.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
I began my remarks by noting that we are
likely to regret a monetary policy that concen-
trates on the No. 1 economic concern of the day
to the exclusion of other concerns. I believe that
the FOMC in recent years has pursued a policy
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Trends, April 2007, p. 1. <www.research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20070401/cover.pdf>.that is broadly on a sound track. I am willing to
quibble on details, and have, but not on funda-
mentals.
There are insistent demands by some that
the FOMC do more. At the Committee’s meeting
next month, which I will not attend as I am retir-
ing from the St. Louis Fed shortly after that meet-
ing, further cuts in the target federal funds rate
may or may not be appropriate. The data on which
the FOMC will base its decision will not be fully
available until the time of the meeting.
I must say that I am a bit troubled that I hear
loud claims that the FOMC did not tighten policy
enough, and soon enough, in 2004-05 to choke
off the bubble in house prices and unwise lend-
ing in the subprime mortgage market, develop-
ments that are at the root of today’s problems. I
do not recall many loud and insistent voices for
tighter policy at that time. Policymakers are not
clairvoyant. I wish I had seen these unfortunate
developments in the housing market in their
early stages, but I didn’t.
My general approach is to think about all the
things that might happen, as best I can, and then
try to determine what is actually happening. My
analysis includes my understanding of lessons
from history. With regard to inflation, we know
that inflation is a more slowly moving process
than is unemployment, but also more persistent
and more difficult to turn around. The seeds of
an inflation problem are sown several years in
advance, and it is not always easy to see the seeds
as they sprout. In present circumstances, mone-
tary policymakers will need to be careful to react
to evidence on the state of the economy and likely
outlook for employment. The issue is likely devel-
opments in the labor market and not merely
possible developments. At the same time, policy-
makers will have to remain conscious of the les-
sons of history with regard to inflation. Here
again, likely developments and not just possible
developments must be the focus of attention.
Risk mitigation to counter costly possible
developments is an important strategy, but taking
out insurance against certain risks is not free. At
any given time, policymakers could pursue a
powerfully expansionary policy to all but elimi-
nate the possibility of a significant recession in
the year ahead, but doing so would come at the
cost and even likelihood of an unacceptable
increase in the rate of inflation. We know that
inflation does not buy a permanent reduction in
unemployment. Indeed, a substantial increase in
the rate of inflation promises a larger recession
later, as the country learned at such great cost in
the 1970s.
Monetary policy is a balancing act. Decisions
must be based on good economic theory and the
most complete information possible. That, in my
experience over the past 10 years, is exactly what
the FOMC does.
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